Bonnie Loffredo and Donald A. Westenskow v. Scott W. Holt : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Bonnie Loffredo and Donald A. Westenskow v.
Scott W. Holt : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott Waterfall.
Leonard E. McGee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Loffredo v. Holt, No. 20000170.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/419
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE LOFFREDO and 
DONALD A. WESTENSKOW, 
Plaintiff/Appellees, 
vs. 
SCOTT W. HOLT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20000170 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
First District Court of 
Box Elder County, State of Utah 
THE HONORABLE THOMAS L. WILMORE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Scott Waterfall 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
4605 Harrison Blvd., Third Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 479-4777 
Leonard E. McGee 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
380 North 200 West, Suite 260 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 298-7200 
FILED 
UTAH S MF 
Of 
CLU... OFTHt_ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE LOFFREDO and 
DONALD A. WESTENSKOW, 
Plaintiff/Appellees, 
vs. 
SCOTT W. HOLT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20000170 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
First District Court of 
Box Elder County, State of Utah 
THE HONORABLE THOMAS L. WILMORE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Leonard E. McGee 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
380 North 200 West, Suite 260 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 298-7200 
Scott Waterfall 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
4605 Harrison Blvd., Third Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 479-4777 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii, iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 2 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
1. Nature of the Case 4 
2. Course of Proceedings 5 
3. Disposition in Lower Court 6 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 10 
ARGUMENT 12 
POINT I The Oral Agreement Between Westenskow and 
Defendant Was Enforceable and Defendant Was 
Entitled to a Contingent Fee Even Absent a 
Written Agreement 
12 
POINT II Did the Defendant Fail to Timely File an 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees Which Would 
Preclude Him From an Award of Fees? 
19 
POINT III Under the Written Fee Agreement With Loffredo, 
the Defendant is Entitled to Attorney's Fees 
and Costs Upon Prevailing on Loffredo's Claims 
Against Defendant 
21 
POINT IV Pre-judgment Interest Should Not Have Been 
Awarded in Favor of Plaintiff Westenskow 
22 
CONCLUSION 23 
ADDENDUM 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409 (Utah 1998) 4, 14 
Bullock v. State Dept. of Transportation, 
966 P.2d 1215 (Utah App. 1998) 4, 18 
Drysdale y. Ford Motor Company, 947 P.2d 678 (Utah 1997) . . . 3 
Equitable Life & Cas. Inc. Co. v. Ross, 
849 P. 2d 1187 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 21 
Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989) 3 
Fitzgerald v. Crutchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah App. 1987) 
22 
Harrington v. Pailthorp, 841 P.2d 1258 (Wash.App.Div.1 1992) 
15 
Higgins v. County, 855 P.2d 234 (Utah 1984) 2 
Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979) 22 
Lowe v. April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1974) 
4, 19 
Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings v. Mehr, 
791 P. 2d 217 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 22 
Orsini v. Larry Mover Trucking, Inc. 833 S.W. 2d 366 (Ark. 1992) 
15 
Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449 (Utah 1989) 4 
Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991) 3 
Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467 (Utah 1992) 2 
Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light, 
776 P.2d 632 (Utah 1989) 3 
Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Hvdroswift Corp. 
528 P.2d 156 (Utah 1974) 4, 18 
White v. Desselhorst, 879 P.2d 1371 (Utah 1994) 3 
ii 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated §15-1-1 4 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 1 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-51-41 4 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c) 2 
Utah R. Prof .Conduct 1.5 3, 13, 14, 16 
i n 
LEONARD E. McGEE - A2185 
NEIL B. CRIST & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
380 North 200 West, Suite 260 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801)298-7200 
Facsimile: (801)298-8950 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE LOFFREDO and DONALD A. 
WESTENSKOW, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
SCOTT W. HOLT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20000170 
The Appellant, Scott Holt, pursuant to Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits this Appeal 
Brief. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(1953), as amended. The order 
appealed from is a final order disposing of all claims of 
the parties. 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the Defendant entitled to payment of attorney's 
fees by Plaintiff Westenskow without an express 
written contingent fee agreement? 
2. Did the Defendant fail to file an affidavit of 
attorney's fees in a timely manner and was the trial 
court correct in then denying him an award of 
attorney's fees against Plaintiff Westenskow? 
3. Is Defendant entitled to attorney's fees and costs as 
against Loffredo, under the written fee agreement 
with Loffredo, for prevailing on Loffredo's claims 
against Defendant? 
4. Was the trial court's award of pre-judgment interest 
in favor of Plaintiff/Appellant Westenskow 
appropriate? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment by the 
trial court is appropriate only when there are no issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Utah R., Civ. P. 56(c), Higgins v. 
County, 855 P.2d 235 (Utah 1984). In reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, the Court views the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. E.g., Smith v. 
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Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992); Rollins v. 
Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1991); Utah State 
Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light, 776 
P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). 
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness, granting them no 
deference. Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989); 
White v. Desselhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994). On 
appeal, the Supreme Court determines only whether the trial 
court erred in applying the governing law and whether the 
"trial court correctly held that there were no disputed 
issues of material fact". Id. In reviewing the trial 
court's decision, the Supreme Court views the facts in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party and will find 
summary judgment proper only when there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules of Civ. P. 
56(c). Drysdale v. Ford Motor Company, 947 P.2d 678, 680 
(Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
A. Rules of Professional Conduct: In making its 
determination, the trial court referred to Rule 1.5 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
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B. Utah Case Law: In making its determination, the 
trial court referred to the Utah Supreme Court decision in 
Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1989). That 
case held that, for a statutory attorney's lien to arise 
between the parties, the contingent fee agreement must be 
in writing; and that, if the terms of the agreement do not 
reflect, in writing, what effect a termination of the 
agreement would have on the fees of the attorney, then 
there does not exist a statutory lien. Archuleta v. 
Hughes, 969 P.2d 409 (Utah 1998) held that Rule 1.5 of the 
Rules of Professional Responsibility does not provide a 
basis for civil liability against attorneys. 
Bullock v. State Department of Transportation, 966 
P.2d 1215 (Utah App. 1998), Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. 
Hyrdoswift Corp., 528 P.2d 156 (Utah 1974), and Lowe v. 
April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1974) are cases 
which hold that a party may, by its actions, ratify a 
contract. 
C. Statutes: The primary statutory provision governing 
attorney's fee liens is U.C.A. §78-51-41 (1953), as amended. 
The primary statutory provision governing the award of 
interest in legal claims is U.C.A §15-1-1 (1953), as amended. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This appeal is from a final order of the First 
Judicial District Court, Hon. Thomas L. Willmore, which 
partially granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and partially granted Defendants Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
2. Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff/Appellee Westenskow filed a Complaint 
against Defendant/Appellant, claiming that Appellee 
Westenskow did not have a written contingent fee agreement 
with Defendant/Appellant and, therefore, did not owe 
Appellant an attorney's fee upon settlement of a wrongful 
death claim. Plaintiff/Appellee Loffredo filed a complaint 
against the Defendant/Appellant in which she claimed that 
Defendant knowingly misrepresented the terms of the written 
contingent fee agreement that she had entered into with the 
Defendant and that Defendant should receive a contingent 
fee of only 25% instead of the 33% Defendant claimed. Both 
Plaintiffs sought a return from Defendant of a total of 
$45,000.00 which Defendant had retained from the settlement 
of Plaintiff's claims as attorney's fees. The Defendant 
/Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asking the 
court to rule that Loffredo owed him an attorney's fee 
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arising for the settlement of the wrongful death action and 
attorney's fees and costs arising out of his action to 
enforce the contingent fee agreement and defending against 
Loffredo's claim against Defendant. 
3. Disposition in Lower Court 
The trial court granted Plaintiff/Appellee 
Westenskow's Motion for Summary Judgment, but denied 
Plaintiff/Appellee Loffredo's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, but did not rule whether or not Loffredo owed 
Defendant/Appellant attorney's fees as set forth in the 
contingent fee agreement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Heidi Westenskow was killed in an automobile accident 
on May 27, 1994. Heidi was the daughter of both 
Plaintiffs in this action. 
2. Plaintiff Loffredo retained Defendant to represent 
her interests in a wrongful death action arising from 
an automobile accident involving Heidi, and signed a 
contingent fee agreement with Defendant. (Attached as 
Exhibit "A", hereto). (Record on Appeal, hereinafter 
"R". 301-304) 
3. In that contingent fee agreement, both Plaintiff 
Loffredo and Defendant agreed that "In the event 
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legal proceedings are necessary to enforce the terms 
of this agreement, the defaulting party agrees to pay 
a reasonable attorney fee plus costs of court." 
4. Plaintiff Westenskow retained another attorney, 
Robert L. Neeley, to represent his interests arising 
from that same automobile accident. (R. 3 01-304) 
5. During a meeting in November, 1994 at Neeley's 
office, it was agreed that Westenskow and Loffredo 
would split any recovery, after costs and attorney's 
fees, with Loffredo receiving 70% and Westenskow 
receiving 30%. (R. 301-304) 
6. It was also agreed during that meeting that Defendant 
would represent Westenskow and that Westenskow would 
pay Defendant a contingent fee on the same terms as 
the written fee agreement that Defendant had with 
Loffredo. (R. 301-304) 
7. Any and all potential conflicts between Defendant and 
Plaintiffs as a result of Defendant's representation 
of both Plaintiffs were openly discussed and 
resolved, with the Plaintiffs agreeing to have 
Defendant represent them both. 
8. Defendant sent a letter to Neeley confirming the oral 
agreement reached in Neeley's office and sent a 
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written fee agreement to Neeley for Westenskow"s 
signature. 
9. Westenskow did receive the written contingent fee 
agreement. (R. 3 01-304) 
10. Defendant did not receive the signed fee agreement 
back from Neeley, but assumed that Westenskow had 
signed the agreement. 
11. On January 27, 1995, Farmer's Insurance Exchange 
filed a complaint on its own behalf, naming 
Loffredo and Westenskow as defendants. 
12. The claims brought in the Farmer's Insurance 
Exchange action were successfully settled in favor 
of the Plaintiffs through the efforts of Defendant 
on April 28, 1995. 
13. On three separate occasions after the settlement of 
the claim Westenskow signed a Settlement Statement 
in which he acknowledged that he was paying a one-
third contingent fee to Defendant and in which he 
acknowledged and reitified his retainer agreement 
with Defendant. (Exhibits "B", UC" and "D", 
attached hereto). (R. 301-304) 
14. Both Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant, 
claiming that they did not owe a fee to Defendant 
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and seeking return of the fees held by Defendant. 
(R. 001-008) 
The trial court ruled that the written fee 
agreement that Defendant had with Loffredo was 
valid but that, because Defendant did not have a 
written fee agreement with Westenskow, Westenskow 
did not owe Defendant a fee. (R. 301-304) 
The trial court held, however, that Westenskow owed 
Defendant a reasonable attorney's fee, apparently 
on a quantum meruit theory, and ordered Defendant 
to file an accounting of time and costs within 
twenty (20) days of the entry of the Memorandum 
Decision on June 29, 1999. (R. 301-304) 
The Plaintiffs filed a proposed Order and Judgment 
on August 19, 1999. 
The trial court signed the Order and Judgment on 
September 1, 1999 (R. 309-311). 
That Order and Judgment was objected to by 
Defendant on September 2, 1999. (R. 312-313) 
On October 18, 1999 Defendant filed his accounting 
of time and costs with the court. 
There was a hearing on Defendant's Objections on 
October 26, 1999. (R. 344) 
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22. Plaintiff Westenskow objected to Defendant's 
accounting of time and costs as not having been 
timely filed with the trial court. 
23. The trial court held that, because the Defendant's 
accounting of time and costs was not timely filed 
under the trial court's Memorandum Decision of June 
29, 1999, Westenskow owed nothing to Defendant for 
any time expended on behalf of Westenskow. (R. 354-
357) 
24. The trial court also did not award attorney's fees 
or costs against Loffredo in favor of Defendant, 
even though the written fee agreement between 
Loffredo and Defendant provided for attorney's fees 
and costs to the prevailing party in event of a 
dispute. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment should be granted only when the 
evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, demonstrates that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The grounds considered by the court in granting the 
Plaintiffs/Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment in this 
case are that 1) Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional 
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Conduct require that a contingent fee agreement be in 
writing, which agreement was not reduced in writing as it 
applied to Plaintiff Westenskow; and, 2) the 
Defendant/Appellant's accounting of fees and costs was not 
timely filed by the Defendant/Appellant and that he should 
not be awarded any fees as against Westenskow. 
Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not 
set forth a standard for civil liability, as the trial 
court attempts to do. Additionally, the contingent fee 
agreement was in writing (although not signed by 
Westenskow), which is all that is required by Rule 1.5. 
Further, the ratification by the Plaintiffs of the 
oral agreement between the parties (by their signatures on 
the Closing Settlement Statements) was enough to justify 
paying a contingent fee to Defendant. 
Defendant did not file his affidavit of attorney's 
fees because he was relying upon the fact that he believed 
that he was in settlement negotiations with the attorney 
for the Plaintiffs, which would preclude the necessity of 
the filing of the affidavit. 
Finally, the trial court failed to order any 
attorney's fees or costs in favor of the Defendant, 
although such fees and costs are allowed in the written, 
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signed fee agreement between Loffredo and Defendant and 
Defendant prevailed in the action against Loffredo. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN WESTENSKOW 
AND DEFENDANT WAS ENFORCEABLE 
AND DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A 
CONTINGENT FEE EVEN ABSENT A 
WRITTEN AGREEMENT 
A) The Rules of Professional Responsibility are not 
a basis for civil liability of an attorney. 
The Plaintiffs met with their respective attorneys in 
November, 1994 in an attempt to resolve the question of 
which party would get what amount from any settlement of 
their wrongful death action which arose from the death of 
their daughter. An agreement between the parties was 
reached (Loffredo agreeing to receive a 70% share and 
Westenskow a 3 0% share, and with Defendant representing 
both Plaintiffs thereafter). The agreement between the 
Plaintiffs and their agreement to have Defendant represent 
them was memorialized in a letter written by Defendant cind 
sent to Robert Neeley, Westenskow's attorney. In that 
letter was enclosed a contingent fee retainer agreement for 
Westenskow to execute. That contingent fee retainer 
agreement also included provisions whereby Westenskow would 
agree to pay a contingent fee to Plaintiff. 
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Several months later, on April 25, 1995, the court 
case between the Plaintiffs and Farmer's Insurance Exchange 
was settled favorably for Plaintiffs. On October 9 and 
again on October 25, 1995, Plaintiffs each signed a 
"Closing Settlement Statement". Each statement settled 
their claims against the insurance companies involved in 
this matter, acknowledged their fee agreement with 
Defendant and agreed with the Defendant's accounting of 
funds from the settlement, including the payment of 
Defendant's attorney's fees and costs. A third Closing 
Settlement Statement was signed by the Plaintiffs, but is 
not dated. 
In their Memorandum in Support of their Motion for 
Summary Judgment the Plaintiffs relied chiefly upon the 
language of Rule 1.5(c) of the Rules of Professional 
Responsibility as their basis for the claim that Defendant 
was not entitled to a contingent fee from Westenskow. 
Rules 1.5(c) of the Rules of Professional 
Responsibility states: 
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the 
matter for which the service is rendered, except 
in a matter in which a contingent fee is 
prohibited 
by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee 
shall be in writing and shall state the method by 
which the fee is to be determined, including the 
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to 
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the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or 
appeal, litigation and other expenses to be 
deducted from the recovery and whether such 
expenses are to be deducted before or after the 
contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion 
of a contingent'fee matter, the lawyer shall 
provide the client with a written statement 
stating the outcome of the matter and, if there 
is a recovery, showing the remittance to the 
client and the method of its determination. 
The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision dated June 
29, 1999, relied solely upon the language of Rule 1.5(c) of 
the Rules of Professional Responsibility in holding that 
the Defendant was not entitled to a contingent fee from 
Westenskow. 
In the case of Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409 (Utah 
1998) , a legal malpractice case, the Supreme Court stated 
that: 
We agree with the court of appeals, and conclude 
that the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct are 
not designed to create a basis for civil 
liability. 
The Rules of Professional Responsibility themselves 
agree with the conclusion of the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Rules of Professional Responsibility, under the 
section entitled "Scope", state: 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a 
cause of action, nor should it create any 
presumption that a legal duty has been breached. 
The Rules are designed to provide guidance to 
lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating 
conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are 
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not designed to be a basis for civil liability. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be 
subverted when they are invoked by opposing 
parties as procedural weapons. The fact that 
a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-
assessment or for sanctioning a lawyer under the 
administration of a disciplinary authority does 
not imply that an antagonist in a collateral 
proceeding or transaction has standing to seek 
enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in 
the Rule should be deemed to augment any 
substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-
disciplinary consequences of violating such a 
duty. (Emphasis added) 
Other jurisdictions have followed the admonition of 
the Rules and have refused to allow the Rules to be a basis 
for civil liability against an attorney. 
The Rules are not designed for a basis for civil 
liability, but are to provide guidance to lawyers 
and to provide a structure for regulatory conduct 
through disciplinary agencies. No cause of 
action should arise from a violation, nor should 
it create any presumption that a legal duty has 
been breached. 
Orsini v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc.. 833 S.W. 2d 366 
(Ark. 1992) . The Washington Court of Appeals in Harrington 
v. Pailthorp. 841 P.2d 1258 (Wash.App.Div.1 1992) held 
that: 
[A]n attorney's violat ion of RPC provisions does 
not give rise to an independent cause of action 
against an attorney. . . Even if Harrington could 
show Pailthorp violated any RPC's, he would have 
no claim against her solely on that basis. 
(Emphasis added) 
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B) Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
does not require that the written contingent fee 
agreement be signed by the parties. 
Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states 
only that: 
A contingent fee shall be in writing and shall 
state the method by which the fee is to be 
determined, including the percentage or 
percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in 
the event of settlement . . . 
There is no requirement under Rule 1.5 that the 
contingent fee agreement be signed by any of the parties. 
The Memorandum Decision entered by the trial court in this 
case states: 
Westenskow entered the matter at a later date and 
did not sign such an agreement, though it appears 
he received a copy of the agreement which he was 
supposed to sign. (R. 301-304) 
In this case, the contingent fee agreement was in 
writing and was supplied to Westenskow, although not signed 
by the parties, and was ratified by Westenskow. 
C) An oral contract can be ratified by the actions or 
statements of a party and can be enforceable. 
In this case, the parties agreed during a meeting 
between them and their respective counsel that: 
1) Defendant would represent both Plaintiffs; 
2) That the Plaintiffs would split any settlement 
between them on the basis of 70% for Loffredo 
and 3 0% for Westenskow; and 
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3) That Defendant would be entitled to a 
contingent fee from Westenskow on the same 
basis as that contained in his written 
contingent fee agreement with Loffredo. That 
is, a contingent fee of 25% prior to filing of 
suit and 33.33% thereafter. 
4) That Defendant would send a written contingent 
fee agreement to Westenskow's then attorney 
and that Westenskow would execute that 
agreement. (R. 3 01-3 04) 
Defendant sent a written contingent fee agreement to 
Westenskow, but Westenskow never signed the fee agreement. 
(R. 3 01-304) However, on three separate occasions, 
Westenskow did sign a document entitled "Closing Settlement 
Statement", wherein it was disclosed to him that his claim 
had settled for a certain amount, that certain expenses 
were being paid out of that settlement and that a 
contingent fee was being paid to Defendant. (R. 3 01-3 04 
and Exhibits UB" through UD", attached hereto). 
Those "Closing Settlement Statements" also contained 
the following paragraph, over the signatures of both 
Loffredo and Westenskow: 
COMES NOW the undersigned who hereby acknowledge 
that they have reviewed the Closing Settlement 
Statement and find that it is in accordance with the 
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terms and conditions of the retainer agreement with 
their Attorney, Scott W. Holt. They further 
acknowledge they authorized said attorney to accept 
said sums as settlement in full for their wrongful 
death claim re: Heidi Westenskow and acknowledge 
receipt of a check for the full amount due each 
client. (Emphasis added) 
In the case of Bullock v. State Department of 
Transportation, 966 P.2d 1215 (Utah App. 1998), the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that: 
Any conduct which indicates assent . . . which is 
justifiable only if there is ratification is 
sufficient [to ratify a contract]. Even silence 
with full knowledge of the facts may manifest 
affirmance and thus operate as a ratification . . 
. (Emphasis added) Id. at 1219. 
In the case of Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Hyrdoswift 
Corp., 528 P.2d 156 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that: 
There is also a well recognized rule that a 
corporation may not represent to another party 
that it has executed a valid contract, induce 
the other to perform, accept the benefits, and 
then when it suits its interest, renege and 
escape the burdens of the contract. By so 
engaging in the business and enjoying its 
advantages the corporation is deemed to ratify 
the contract, wherefore, it cannot then repudiate 
and avoid its obligations. (Emphasis added) 
id. at 157 
Although obviously not corporations, the general rule 
set forth above applies equally to private individuals such 
as the Plaintiffs in this case. While a written contract 
between Westenskow and Defendant was never executed, an 
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oral agreement was certainly entered into between them. 
(R. 301-304) 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
"Implied [ratification may arise] under circumstances of 
acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm is not promptly 
exercise." Lowe v. April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297 
(Utah 1974). In this case, the Plaintiffs orally agreed to 
have Defendant jointly represent them in their wrongful 
death claim; then, upon settlement of the claim, and in 
writing, agreed with the settlement and the disbursement of 
the monies from the settlement, including Defendant's 
contingent fee; and then, without making complaint, cashed 
their checks from the Defendant. It wasn't until some 
three months after they signed the "Closing Settlement 
Agreement" that some "buyer's remorse" occurred and they 
wanted to abrogate the agreement with Defendant. 
Westenskow ratified the oral contingent fee agreement 
that he had with the Defendant and he should be held to 
that agreement. 
II 
DID THE DEFENDANT FAIL TO TIMELY FILE 
AN AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WHICH 
WOULD PRECLUDE HIM FROM AN AWARD OF FEES? 
On June 30, 1999, the trial court issued a Memorandum 
Decision (R. 301-304) in which it ruled partly in favor of 
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Plaintiffs and partly in favor of Defendant. In that 
Memorandum Decision, the trial court ordered the Defendant 
to file an affidavit of attorney's fees and costs within 
twenty (20) days of the date that the decision was issued. 
It wasn't until August 19, 1999 that the attorney for 
Plaintiffs got around to filing an Order and Judgment based 
on the Memorandum Decision of the trial court. Defendant 
filed an Objection to the Order and Judgment filed by 
Plaintiffs on September 2, 1999. 
During the period of time from June 30, 1999 until the 
Defendant filed his Affidavit of Fees and Costs on October 
18, 1999, Plaintiff's attorney and Defendant were in 
settlement negotiations, attempting to resolve this matter. 
Settlement negotiations continued until Defendant left for 
a trip out of the country on August 3, 1999. On August 19, 
1999, while Defendant was out of the country (and 
Plaintiff's counsel was aware of Defendant's absence), the 
Order and Judgment was filed. 
Defendant assumed that during such negotiations he 
would not be required to file his affidavit of fees and 
costs, which would only serve to further inflate those 
fees. Defendant believed that he could rely on statements 
by Plaintiff's counsel that he was going to talk with his 
clients and get back to Defendant and that a filing of 
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Defendant's Affidavit of Fees and Costs would not be 
required until the settlement negotiations broke down. 
Ill 
UNDER THE WRITTEN FEE AGREEMENT WITH 
LOFFREDO, THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS UPON PREVAILING 
ON LOFFREDO'S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT 
In the written fee agreement between Loffredo and 
Defendant, the parties agree that: 
In the event legal proceedings are necessary to 
enforce the terms of this agreement, the defaulting 
party agrees to pay a reasonable attorney fee 
plus costs of court. 
Loffredo brought suit against Defendant, claiming that 
she did not owe him an attorney's fee under the contingent 
fee agreement. The trial court held against Loffredo and 
held that she did, under the terms of the written contingent 
fee agreement, owe Defendant an attorney's fee. 
Clearly, Defendant prevailed on that issue. Under the 
express written terms of the fee agreement, he is entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs against Loffredo. "If provided for 
by contract, attorney fees are awarded in accordance with the 
terms of that contract." Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah.Ct.App.1993). Where a 
contract provides the "right to attorney fees, Utah courts 
have allowed the party who successfully prosecuted or 
defended against a claim to recover the fees attributable to 
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those claims on which the party was successful." 
Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings v. Mehrr 791 P.2d 217, 
221 (Utah Ct.App.1990). The trial court erred in failing to 
award Defendant attorney's fees and costs against Loffredo. 
IV 
PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN AWARDED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF WESTENSKOW 
The trial court held that pre-judgment interest should 
be awarded to the Plaintiff on the amounts of the contingent 
fee that Defendant owes Westenskow. The trial court relied 
on the cases of Fitzgerald v. Crutchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 
(Utah App. 1987) and Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 801 (Utah 
1979). However, those cases both dealt with claims based on 
contracts. 
In this case, the trial court found that there was not a 
written fee agreement between Westenskow and Defendant. 
Absent such a "contract", pre-judgment interest is not 
appropriate. U.C.A. §15-1-1 (1953), as amended, provides for 
pre-judgment interest only in cases where the interest is 
provided for in the contract. There are no other statutory 
provisions which support the trial court's conclusion that an 
award of pre-judgment interest was appropriate in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court found that there was an agreement 
between Westenskow and Defendant, but that the contingent fee 
agreement between them was not in writing. Using Rule 1.5 of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct as its basis, the trial 
court found that Westenskow did not owe a contingent fee to 
Defendant. The trial court erred in that conclusion because 
1) the trial court should not have relied solely on Rule 1.5 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct; 2) there was a written 
contingent fee agreement between Westenskow and Defendant, 
albeit not signed; and 3) there was an oral agreement 
allowing for a contingent fee between Westenskow and 
Defendant, which Westenskow ratified three times in writing. 
The trial court erred in denying Defendant's Affidavit 
of Attorney's Fees. The Defendant was in negotiations with 
the Plaintiffs regarding this matter and believed, rightly, 
that an affidavit was not necessary at that time. In any 
event, the trial court erred in denying completely any 
attorney's fees for Defendant based solely on his inadvertent 
failure to file an attorney's fee affidavit within a time 
limit set by the court. 
Finally, the trial court erred in failing to award 
attorney's fees in favor of the Defendant against Plaintiff 
Loffredo when Defendant prevailed in the action brought by 
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Loffredo. The written, signed contingent fee agreement 
between Loffredo and Defendant clearly provided that the 
prevailing party would be awarded attorney's fees and 
costs. The trial court should have awarded those fees and 
costs against Loffredo. 
DATED this /(WL day of August, 2000. 
NEIL B. CRIST & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
By: X / ^ ^ ^ 
(_LjEOltfARD E. McGEE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was sent, via First Class 
U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to the following counsel of 
record, this /dfrL day of August, 2 000: 
Scott Waterfall 
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/Appellees 
4605 Harrison Blvd., Third Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
C^1^ 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A 
EXHIBIT B 
EXHIBIT C 
EXHIBIT D 
EXHIBIT E 
EXHIBIT F 
Retainer Agreement 
Closing Settlement Statement (First) 
Closing Settlement Statement (Second) 
Closing Settlement Statement (Third) 
Memorandum Decision (June 29, 1999) 
Order and Judgment (January 26, 2000) 
Memorandum Decision (December 15, 1999) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-51-41 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 
RETAINER AGREEMENT 
— • * ^ 
This Agreement made this */ day of W\ **^f 
and between G o ^ ' - * ^ UoCf^^-<L 
at 
. 1 9 ? * . by 
who resides 
, hereinafter 
referred to as CLIENT and SCOTT W. HObT. hereinafter referred to as ATTORNEY. 
Client retains Attorney in the following mattcr(s): , c l ^ L 
-J^A^UA,,!: 
>*-C 
-gi*~i »qH 
^ ^ 
- ^ 
and empowers him to do all things and tc effect a compromise in said matter, or 
to institute such legal action as may be advisable in his judgment and agrees to 
pay for his services: 
a. y^S percent of the amount recovered -with—&- without 
suit."*"" In the event of appeal, an additional agreement for services shall be 
made by the parties. 
forthwith and the balance of S 
Costs and necessary disbursements arc to be advanced by client, prior to 
hearing, or trial. 
Client agrees to make no settlement with the opposing party except in 
the presence of the Attorney; any settlement so obtained shall be subject to the 
terms of this agreement. 
Client agrees thai he will not substitute Attorneys without the consent 
of the Attorney: substitutions in violation hereof shall entitled the Attorney to 
full fee set fonh above. 
It is agreed that Attorney has made no representations regarding the 
successful termination of the cause of action. 
6 
In the event legal proceedings; arc necessary to enforce the terms of 
this agreement the defaulting party agrees to pay a reasonable attorney fee 
plus costs of Court. 
ACCEPTED-
ATTORNEY 
4> • ^ 
CLIENT ~r~^ 
AA_L ^  cc~. -iv s *•->*-
CLIENT 
C 
f> ~T yCl—-~_^c-^.-
USAA Undcrinsured coverage settlement 
Less Attorney's fees as per Retainer Agreement (3 1/3 
Subtota l : 23.333.33 
Less Costs and Expenses in arrears 
NET SETTLEMENT TO BONNIE LOFFREDO 
NET SETTLEMENT TO DONALD WESTENSKOW 
-0 -
S 16,333.33 
5 7,000,00,, - ^ 
< b * ^ 
BALANCE REMAINING: - 0 -
AC<NOWLEDGMENT 
COMES NOW* the undersigned who hereby acknowledge that they have 
reviewed the Closing Settlement Statement and find that it is in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of the re:ainer agreement with their Attorney. 
Scott W. Holt. They further acknowledge they authorized said at:omey to 
accept said sums as settlement in full for their wrongful death claim re: Heidi 
Westenskcw and acknowledge receipt of a check for the ful! amount cue each 
c i i e n c . 
^ < £ ^ U 0 
'oa 
DA i ED this aav ot 199: 
, / X I ^ , - s 
-SONME LOFFREDO / / 
DONALD WESTENSKOW 
EXHIBIT B 
Less Attorney's fees as per Retainer Agreement @ 1/3 
Sub to ta l : 
16.666.67 y r 
33.333.33 
Less Cosis incurred: 
Certification fee of Judgment 
Remaining Balance:-
NET SETTLEMENT TO BONNIE L0FFR5DO 
NET SETTLEMENT TO DONALD W5STENSKOW 
urn 
5 33.328.33 
S 23,322.33 "&° 
S 9,995.50 ^ 
^ 
BALANCE REMAINING: •0-
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
COMES NOW the undersigned who hereby acknowledge that they have 
reviewed the Closing Settlement Statement and find that it is in accordance 
with the icr^ns and conditions of the retainer agreement with their Attorney, 
Scott W. Holt. They further ac:<no wledge they authorized said attorney to 
accept said sums as settlement in full :cr their wrongful death claim re: Held: 
Wescenskow and acknowledge receioc of a check: for ihc lull amount cue each 
r ' i » n f 
D A i ED this 
S2> 
-BONNE L O F F R E D O ^ 
S/J^/^jfaZZofe y_ 
DOTHALD WESTENSKOW 
EXHIBIT C 
POLICY LIMITS FROM STATE FARM: S 50.000.00 "' J ^ . 
s- ^ > ^ 
Less Atiorncy's fees as per Retainer Agreement <2> 1/3 / 1 6 . 6 6 6 ^ J J 
Subtota l : S 33,333.34 
Less Funerai Expenses (Previously paid directly 
to Chapel of Flowers): £ 3.000.00 
Subtota l : 
Reimbursement to Bonnie Loffredo for out of pocket 
and non-reimbursed expenses re: Keidi 
Total Net Settlement: 
To Bonnie Loffredo 
(Plus reimbursement) 
Total: 
To Donald Wescenskcw 
AGCNCWL 
COMES NOW the undersigned and acknowledge that they have reviewed 
the closing statement and fine that i: is in accordance with the terms of me 
re:a:ner agreement. That they runner acknowledge they authorized SCOTT \v\ 
KOLT to disburse t ie proceeds pursuant to the Closicg Staiement. Further, that 
they acknowledge receipt of a check for the furl amount due each client. They 
also understands that if there are any additional medicai expenses which have 
not been paid to date that any said amounts would be paid from tne ne: 
proceeds and they would be responsible to pay chem. 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
30.333.34 
- 3.35^ 10 
26.979.24 
IS. 8Z5A6 
3.35-i.iO ' / 
nn ^ ^  /> c ^ &*& 
8.993.77 _<)0 
BONNIE LOFFREDO 
DONALD WESTENSKOW 
EXHIBIT D 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE LOFFREDO and DONALD 
A. WESTENSKOW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. [ 
SCOTT W.HOLT ] 
Defendant ' 
| MEMORANDUM DECISION 
| Case No. 980100068 
| Judge Thomas L, Wfflmore 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs* and Defendant's separate motions for 
summary judgment Plaintiffs and Defendant each filed in response to said motions and on May 
25,1999, the court heard oral argument. Having considered the matter, the Court now issues this 
Memorandum Decision, 
On May 31,1994, Bonnie Lof&edo (Loffredo) executed a contingent fee agreement 
securing Defendant's services in a wrongful death action which arose when her daughter was 
killed in an automobile accident The agreement provided that Defendant would receive 25% of 
any recovery or 33 1/3% "if suit is filed." 
On November 8,1994, Defendant and Lof&edo attended a meeting in attorney Robert 
Neeley's office to discuss an apportionment of recovery with the decedent's father, Donald A. 
Westenskow (Westenskow). At the time, Robert Neeley represented Westenskow and Defendant 
represented Lof&edo. 
During the meeting, it was agreed that Westenskow would receive 30% of any recovery 
and Defendant would receive 70%. It was also agreed that Defendant would represent both 
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parties and that Westenskow would sign a contingent fee retainer agreement with Defendant 
identical to the Loffredo agreement. In the end, Westenskow Med to sign the agreement 
In January of 1995, Fanners Insurance Exchange filed a declaratory action naming 
Loffredo and Westenskow as defendants. Farmers Insurance Exchange was one of three 
insurance companies potentially providing coverage for the accident at issue. Eventually, the 
three insurance companies settled with Plaintifis and tendered payment via three separate checks 
totaling $135,000. As each check was received, Defendant withdrew 33 1/3% and apportioned 
the remaining sum 70/30 as per the parties agreement. Loffredo and Westenskow signed three 
separate settlement statements over the course of several weeks that noted Defendant's 
withholding of 33 1/3% as fees. 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges Defendant wrongfully withheld fees from the settlement in 
that he was not entitled to 33 1/3% of the recovery* 
Rule L5(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct requires contingent fee agreements to be 
written, Loffredo signed the agreement provided by Defendant prior to the representation. 
Westenskow entered the matter at a later date and did not sign such an agreement, though it 
appears he received a copy of the agreement which he was supposed to sign. 
The Court has considered the filings, affidavits, and arguments set forth by the parties, 
and finds that no issues of disputed material feet exist and judgment may issue as a matter of law. 
The Court finds that plaintiff Bonnie Loffredo is bound by the contingent fee agreement 
Farmers insurance Exchange filed suit and Defendant represented Plaintiffs in that matter. 
Therefore, Defendant is entitled to 33 1/3% of die recovery from Bonnie Loffredo, sums already 
retained by Defendant. 
Plaintiff Westenskow, however, did not sign the contingent fee agreement The Court 
finds that since Westenskow did not sign the contingent fee agreement, he is not subject to its 
terms. Phillips v. Smithu 768 P.2d 449,451 (Utah 1989). Nevertheless, Defendant provided 
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services on behalf of Westenskow, from which Westenskow benefitted. Plaintiff Westenskow 
will be liable to Defendant for a reasonable fee for services rendered. Therefore, the Court orders 
defendant to submit an accounting of time and costs expected on behalf of Westenskow within 
20 days from the date of this Memorandum Decision- If Westenskow objects to any portion of 
Defendant's accounting then Westenskow must file his objections with the Court within 14 days 
from receipt of Defendant's accounting. The Court will review any objections by Westenskow. 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are 
denied in part and granted in part as provided herein. 
This Memorandum Decision issues Mscrj day of June, 1999. 
/. 
Thomas Willmorc 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for case 
980100068 by the method and on the date specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail Scott W. Holt 
44 North Main Street 
LaytonUT 84041 
Mail R Scott Waterfall 
4605 South Harrison BlvA Suite 300 
Ogden UT 84403 
Dated this 3 0 of _ j J u n ^ , 1999. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
. . , r»-»* 
R. SCOTT WATERFALL #3680 
CATHERINE F. LABATTE #6763 
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
4605 Harrison Boulevard, Third Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone (801) 479-4777 
Facsimile (801) 479-4804 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE LOFFREDO and 
DONALD A. WESTENSKOW, 
Plaintiffs, 
SCOTT W. HOLT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 980100068CN 
Judge Thomas L. Willmore 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiffs' and Defendant's separate motions 
for summary judgment. Plaintiffs and Defendant each filed responses to said motions and on 
May 25, 1999 the Court heard oral argument. Plaintiffs were present and represented by counsel, 
R. Scott Waterfall. Defendant was present, acting pro se. The Court entered its Memorandum 
Decision on June 29,1999. 
On August 17, 1999, Plaintiffs submitted an Order and Judgement based on this 
Memorandum Decision to which Defendant objected. 
A further hearing on this matter and Defendant's Objection to Order was held came 
before the Coun on October 20. 1999. The Court heard oral argument from Plaintiff*' m.m^l 
R. Scott Waterfall, and Defendant Scott W. Holt, acting pro se. The court entered its 
Memorandum Decision on December 15, 1999. Based upon its June 29, 1999 and December 
15, 1999, Memorandum Decisions the Court makes and enters the following Order and 
Judgment: 
1. Plaintiff Bonnie Loffredo entered a written contingent attorney fee agreement with 
Defendant Holt and is bound by its terms. Farmers Insurance Exchange filed suit and Defendant 
represented Plaintiff Loffredo in that matter concerning the wrongful death of Plaintiff s 
daughter, Heidi Westenskow. Therefore, Plaintiff Loffredo's claim for return a portion of the 
attorneys fees is denied. 
2. Plaintiff Donald A. Westenskow did not sign a contingent attorney fee agreement 
with Defendant. Therefore, Defendant Holt is not entitled to a contingent attorneys fee. 
Defendant was ordered to submit to the Court a claim for reasonable attorney fees for services 
rendered no later than twenty (20) days from the Memorandum Decision dated June 29, 1999 
(July 19, 1999). 
3. Defendant Holt failed to submit his time accounting in a timely manner and the 
Court will not allow Defendant's late filing. Further, Defendant Holt did not keep accurate time 
records. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to attorney fees incurred on behalf of Plaintiff 
Westenskow. 
4. Defendant Scott W. Holt is ordered to pay plaintiff Donald A. Westenskow and 
Judgment is entered in favor of Donald A. Westenskow against defendant, Scott W. Holt, as 
follows: 
Returri.of withheld funds 513,500.00 (1/3 x 540,500.00 (30% x 5135,000)) 
Accrued pre-judgment interest 5,737.50 (10% per annum per UCA§ 15-1-1) 
for 10/1/95 to 12/31/99 
Costs: 
Court filing 5120.00 
Service of process 12.00 
Deposition of Scott Holt 135.00 
267.00 
JUDGMENT AMOUNT 519,504.50 
5. Prejudgment interest shall continue for January 1, 2000 through the date of entry of 
Judgment at 53.70 per day. 
6. The judgment shall be augmented by costs of collection including reasonable attorney 
fees, costs and post judgment interest. 
DATED this X(t day of January, 2000. 
By the Court: 
)MAS L. WILLMORE 
S :"^^^^^^/Di^tr ict Court Judge 
^ V-- f t - A 
^ 3 ^ W A H 
Order 
Loffredo v. Holt 
Case No. 980100068 
Certificate of Mailine 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the forgoing Order via 
facsimile (801) 546-1420 and U.S. Mail to Scott W. Holt, 44 North iMain, Layton, Utah 84041, 
on this £ H ^ day of January, 2000. 
^~^J3^A 
Paralegal 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), Utah Rules if Judicial Administration, the original Order and 
Judgment will be submitted to the Court after five (5) days if no objection is filed. 
Order 
Loffredo v. Holt 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
BONNIE LOFFREDO and DONALD | HON. THOMAS L. WILLMORE 
WESTENSKOW, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs
- I MEMORANDUM DECISION 
SCOTT W. HOLT, 
Defendant- Case No. 980100068 CN 
This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs' proposed Order and Judgment and defendant's 
Objection to Judgment and Order. Oral argument was presented to the Court on October 20, 1999. 
Having heard the argument of the parties and reviewing written memoranda filed by the parties, the 
Court now issues this Memorandum Decision. The pertinent facts concerning the proposed Order and 
Judgment and Objection thereto are as follows: 
1. On June 29, 1999, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision granting in 
part and denying in part plaintiffs' and defendant's Motions for Summary 
Judgment. Specifically, the Court ruled that Westenskow did not sign a 
contingent fee agreement and was not subject to its terms. It was ordered that 
Westenskow would be liable to defendant for reasonable fees for services 
rendered on his behalf and the remainder would be returned by defendant to 
Westenskow. 
2. The Court ordered defendant to submit an accounting of time and costs 
expended on behalf of Westenskow within twenty days from the date of the 
Memorandum Decision. 
3. On August 19,1999, plaintiffs filed an Order and Judgment with the Court. 
4. On September 2,1999, defendant filed an Objection to Judgment and Order. 
5. Defendant did not file an accounting until October 18,1999. 
The first issue before the Court is whether defendant should be allowed to claim attorney's 
fees when he failed to comply with the Court's Order and submit an accounting within twenty days of 
the Court's Memorandum Decision. The Memorandum Decision was issued on June 29, 1999. The 
Memorandum Decision clearly informs the defendant to submit an accounting of time expended on 
behalf of Westenskow within twenty days of the date of the Memorandum Decision. Therefore, 
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Defendant did not file anything with the Court until September 2, 1999, when he filed an 
Objection to the Judgment and Order. No accounting of defendant's time expended on behalf of 
Westenskow was filed with the Objection on September 2nd. It was not until October 18, 1999 that 
defendant filed an Affidavit of time incurred. Therefore, it was not until approximately three months 
after its due date did defendant file an accounting with the Court. 
At the oral argument on October 20, 1999, the defendant argued that he and plaintiffs' 
counsel had been in negotiations concerning settlement of the judgment amount and that defendant had 
made an offer to plaintiffs to settle the case. Defendant submits that he did not file an accounting 
because it was his understanding that negotiations were ongoing. 
Defendant's argument is unsupported by the facts. There is a letter dated July 13, 1999 
from plaintiffs' counsel to defendant indicating that defendant's offer would be reviewed with his 
clients, but there is nothing in the letter stating that an Order and Judgment would not be submitted to 
the Court pending the negotiations. Defendant did not send a confirming letter to plaintiffs' counsel 
about waiting to submit the Order while settlement negotiations continued. Neither did defendant file 
a simple request with the Court for more time to submit an accounting. The continued failure of 
defendant to follow-up with simple details is the very reason this case is again before the Court. 
An examination of defendant's Affidavit of accounting clearly shows that it is "estimated 
time." Also, plaintiffs' counsel has pointed the Court to defendant's answers to interrogatories numbers 
6 and 8, dated February 26,1998 which were signed by the defendant and indicates that no time records 
have been kept in the case. In order for defendant to be reimbursed for his time, he must submit to the 
Court an accurate and reliable accounting of time incurred on behalf of defendant Westenskow. The 
Court finds that defendant has failed to do so. 
Therefore, defendant has failed to comply with the Court's Order in the Memorandum 
Decision issued June 29,1999. Defendant did not file an accounting with the Court until approximately 
three months after its due date. Since defendant's accounting is not timely filed, the Court will not 
al low it and defcnrtant will nnt ?wwi//» o«,r „~~AU C~» ~H J | 
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The next issue before the Court is whether any specific findings of fact or conclusions of 
law were required to be submitted in the Order and Judgment. In a letter to the Court dated October 
29,1999, the defendant submits that specific findings of fact are not required in a Summary Judgment. 
Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the trial Court need not enter findings 
of tact and conclusions of law in rulings on Motions. 
The final issue raised by defendant Is whether statutory pre-judgment interest of 10 % is 
applicable to plaintiffs' Judgment against defendant. Defendant submits that plaintiffs' right to pre-
judgment interest pursuant to UC A § 15-1-1 is applicable only to contracts. In the Court's June29,1999 
Memorandum Decision, it ruled that defendant's attorney's fees were not proper pursuant to an 
unsigned contingent fee agreement and that defendant should return the attorney's fees to Westenskow 
subject to defendant's reasonable time worked on behalf of Westenskow. In other words, defendant 
owed a sum certain from the date of settlement to Westenskow. The law is clear that Westenskow is 
entitled to pre-judgment interest on this overdue debt from the date it should have been paid until entry 
of Judgment. Fitzgerald v. Critchfield 744 P. 2d 301,304 (Utah App. 1987) The issue of pre-judgment 
interest "is injected by law into every action for the payment of past due money." Lignell v. Berg, 593 
P. 2d 800,801 (Utah 1979). Therefore, Westenskow is entitled to pre-judgment interest from the date 
of the personal injury settlement to the date of Judgment. 
Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to prepare an Order in conformance with this Memorandum 
Decision. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the j(r, f"*1 day of December, 1999,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, in the case of Loffredo/Westenskow vs. Holt, 
case number 980100068 as follows: 
R. Scott Waterfall 
Catherine F. Labatte 
Attorneys At Law 
4605 Harrison Boulevard, 3rd Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84403-7000 
Scott W. Holt 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
UT ST § 78-51-41, Compensation-Lien Pagel 
Utah Code § 78-51-41 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78, JUDICIAL CODE 
PART VI. ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 
CHAPTER 51. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this 
document.) 
Current through End of 1999 General Sess. 
§ 78-51-41. Compensation—Lien 
The compensation of an attorney and counselor for services is governed by agreement, express or 
implied, which is not restrained by law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an 
answer containing a counterclaim or at the time that the attorney and client enter into a written or oral 
employment agreement, the attorney who is so employed has a lien upon the client's cause of action or 
counterclaim, which attaches to any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment in the client's favor 
and to the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be affected by any settlement 
between the parties before or after judgment. Any written employment agreement shall contain a 
statement that the attorney has a lien upon the client's cause of action or counterclaim. 
As last amended by Chapter 100, Laws of Utah 1989. 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART VI, ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 
CHAPTER 5L GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
PART II. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
CHAPTER 13. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP 
Current with amendments received through 11-1-1999 
RULE 1.5 FEES 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. 
A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left 
with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered 
as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: 
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, and it is reasonably foreseeable that total 
attorneys fees to the client will exceed $750.00, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the 
client, in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. 
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a 
matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement 
shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the 
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, 
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery and whether such expenses are to be 
deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the 
lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a 
recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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*1179 (d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge or collect: 
(1) Any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the 
securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or 
(2) A contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case. 
(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if: 
(1) The division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement 
with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; 
(2) The client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all lawyers involved; and 
(3) The total fee is reasonable. 
[Amended effective September 1, 1995.] 
Comment 
Basis or Rate of Fee 
When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding 
concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as 
to the fee should be promptly established in writing, where it is reasonably foreseeable that the fees will 
exceed $750.00. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only 
those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate 
is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount or to identify the factors that may be taken 
into account in finally fixing the fee. When developments occur during the representation that render an 
earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client. A written 
statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a 
simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of 
the fee is set forth. 
Terms of Payment 
A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee but is obligated to return any unearned portion. See 
Rule 1.14(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an 
enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or 
subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(j). However, a fee paid in property instead of money 
may be subject to special scrutiny because it involves questions concerning both the value of the services 
and the lawyer's special knowledge of the value of the property. 
*1180 An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail 
services for the client or perform them in any way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer 
should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when 
it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately 
explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of 
a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's 
ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using 
wasteful procedures. When there is doubt whether a contingent fee is consistent with the client's best 
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interest, the lawyer should offer the client alternative bases for the fee and explain their implications. 
Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage. 
Division of Fee 
A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in 
the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which 
neither alone could serve the client as well and most often is used when the fee is contingent and the 
division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist. Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to divide a 
fee either on the basis of the proportion of services they render or by agreement between the participating 
lawyers if all assume responsibility for the representation as a whole and the client is advised and does 
not object. It does not require disclosure to the client of the share that each lawyer is to receive. Joint 
responsibility for the representation entails the obligations stated in Rule 5.1 for purposes of the matter 
involved. Rule 1.5(e) is not intended to prevent the sale of a law practice (including goodwill) if the sale 
otherwise complies with the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Disputes Over Fees 
If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation 
procedure established by the Bar, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may 
prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or 
administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee, as part of the measure of damages. The 
lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should 
comply with the prescribed procedure. 
*1181 Code Comparison 
The factors of a reasonable fee in Rule 1.5(a) are substantially identical to those listed in DR 2-106(B). 
EC 2-17 states that a lawyer "should not charge more than a reasonable fee...." 
There was no counterpart to paragraph (b) in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 2-19 stated that it 
is "usually beneficial to reduce to writing the understanding of the parties regarding the fee, particularly 
when it is contingent." 
There was likewise no counterpart to paragraph (c) in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 2-20 
provided: "Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly accepted in the United 
States," but "a lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent fee basis by one 
who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee...." 
With regard to paragraph (d), DR 2-106(C) prohibited "a contingent fee in a criminal case." EC 2-20 
provided that "contingent fee arrangements in domestic relation cases are rarely justified." 
With regard to paragraph (e), DR 2-107(A) permitted division of fees only if: "(1) The client consents 
to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees will be made. (2) The 
division is in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each. (3) The total fee 
does not exceed clearly reasonable compensation...." Paragraph (e) permits division without regard to 
the services rendered by each lawyer if they assume joint responsibility for the representation. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1998.] 
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